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NATURAL LAW
IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE
DanielR. Heimbacht
"As an atheist, I am honest to myself and respect natural law.
Christians have to deny basic laws of nature and deceive their
own common sense in order to maintain their belief"'
- James Sansom
I. INTRODUCTION

How should evangelicals seeking to influence the public square respond
to atheists like James Sansom who think natural law justifies a naturalistic
ethic completely contrary to what we espouse? Should we use the same
natural law approach on which such atheists rely, or should we employ
something else? I will argue that once the surrounding culture denies the
reflected presence of divinely sourced moral standards in nature, relying on
nothing more than nature as it is ceases to be a viable strategy for
influencing the public square. I will also argue that, until a culture reaches
that point, natural law can be a strategy for building moral apologetics with
nonbelievers.
My aim is limited. I do not dispute the reflection of supernaturally
imposed moral order in nature; I affirm biblical doctrine on the sufficiency
of natural evidences justifying God's condemnation of fallen humanity; and
I believe that creation has an appeal sufficient to lift the mind of
nonbelievers to see the reflection of God in nature.
I aim only at the viability of employing natural law on atheistic terms for
building support for biblically acceptable moral standards in the public
square. I mean only to address the utility of employing natural law in
t Professor of Christian Ethics, Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary; Ph.D.
(law, politics and Christian ethics) and M.Phil. (law, politics and Christian ethics), Drew
University Graduate School; M.Div. (theology) and M.A. (philosophy of religion), Trinity
Evangelical Divinity School; B.S. (oceanography), United States Naval Academy; defense
policy certificate, Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government. From
December 1985 to January 1989, Dr. Heimbach served as aide to Senator Richard Lugar (RIN), from January 1989 to February 1991 he served on the White House staff of President
George H. W. Bush as Deputy Executive Secretary of the Domestic Policy Council, and
from February 1991 to February 1993 served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Manpower. He composed the moral framework that President Bush applied in the Persian
Gulf War and helped lead the coalition opposing the Clinton effort to normalize
homosexuality in the armed services.
1. James Sansom, Letter to the Editor, Atheists More Honest, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 8, 2006, at A24.
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nontheistic terms as a strategy for influencing those who refuse to
acknowledge anything in or beyond nature to justify restraining natural
passions.

II.

RESURGENT INTEREST

My reason for addressing this issue comes from a surge of recent interest
among evangelicals in using natural law for moral apologetics in secular
culture. Catholics have long espoused natural law for engaging the culture,
and their proponents today include Robert George, John Finnis, George
Weigel, Timothy Fuller, Clarence Thomas, and J. Budziszewski. Other
natural law proponents today include various anthropocentric secularists
like Hugh Hefner who justifies sexual indulgence by "a sense of connection
to the humankind and nature on this planet, ' 2 Peter Singer who sees nothing
in nature to require concluding that sex with animals in any way offends
"our status and dignity as human beings, 3 and Andrew Sullivan who
justifies "a diversity of moral sexual experience and identity" because he
believes that observing nature reveals that "Homo sapiens is a moderately
adulterous species, made up primarily of mildly unfaithful male-female
couples with a small minority of same-sex coupling."4
Now joining these proponents is a growing number of evangelicals who
are urging fellow Protestants to reject historic skepticism toward natural
law in hope of enhancing moral influence in the public square. This
development is separating evangelicals into traditionalists and revivalists.
On the traditionalist side, R. Albert Mohler 5 and John Warwick
Montgomery 6 agree with the late Carl F. H. Henry who urged evangelicals
2. Ronald Bruce Meyer, Hugh M Hefner and Playboy (1953), Dec. 10, 2004,
http://www.ronaldbrucemeyer.com/rants/1210almanac.htm.
3, Peter

Singer,

Heavy

Petting,

NERVE,

Mar.

12,

2001,

available

at

http://www.utilitarian.net/singer/by/2001 ----.htm.
4. ANDREW SULLIVAN, THE CONSERVATIVE SOUL 97 (2006).

5. Mohler argues that "[t]o revert to natural law reasoning is to retreat from the high
ground of the Christian truth claim" and warns that "it is not possible for evangelicals to
adopt natural law reasoning as a basis for moral argumentation and remain authentically
evangelical."

R. Albert Mohler, Homosexuality in Theological Perspective, Part 4, Oct. 6,

2005, http://www.albertmohler.com/commentaryread.php?cdate=2005-10-06.
6. Montgomery says that "[t]he Natural Law Theory cannot hold up... because in
different culture[s] there are different values." He asserts, "There is not a simple set of
values that is universally accepted." John Warwick Montgomery, Human Rights &
Christianity: Why They Are Inseparable, Lecture at University of California at Los Angeles
(Feb. 1, 2006), as quoted in Michelle Vu, Human Rights, ChristianityInseparable,Says
World Renown [sic] Apologist, CMiSTIQ POST, Feb. 6, 2006, available at
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to engage the culture but without accommodating "postmodern nihilism" in
the guise of natural law.7 On the revivalist side, R. C. Sproul,8 Norm
Geisler, 9 Chuck Colson,' Stephen Grabil," Craig A. Boyd, 12 and J. Daryl
Charles,13 think evangelicals must either embrace natural law or lose hope
of engaging the culture on moral issues.
Articles by Alan Johnson and Carl Braaten launched the present
movement to revise Protestant thinking on natural law, 14 and these stirred
Carl F. H. Henry to warn that Protestants must reject the false promises of
natural law philosophy. 5 Now Stephen Grabill, Craig Boyd, and J. Daryl
Charles are again trying to shift Protestant attitudes on natural law by
arguing that Protestant luminaries such as Carl F. H. Henry, Helmut
Thielicke, Herman Dooyeweerd, Cornelius Van Til, and G. C. Berkouwer
http://www.christianpost.corn/article/20060206/7824-HumanRights%2C-Christianity-lnse
parable%2C SaysWorldRenownApologist.htm.
7. Carl F. H. Henry, Natural Law and a Nihilistic Culture, FIRST THINGS 54 (Jan.
1995).
8. R.C. Sproul, Address at the Faith and Law Group Inaugural Meeting (n.d.); see also
R.C. Sproul, Natural Theology and Science, in DEFENDING THE FAITH (2003).
9. NORMAN L. GEISLER & FRANK TUREK, LEGISLATING MORALITY (1998).
10. Colson says, "Belief in natural law-whether one believes that law is God-given or
exists on a more intuitive level-is the only real basis we have to support moral positions."
Charles W. Colson, Self-Evident Truth, JUBILEE (Feb. 1992).
11. See STEPHEN J. GRABILL, REDISCOVERING THE NATURAL LAW IN REFORMED
THEOLOGICAL ETHics (2006).
Grabill accuses evangelicals of lacking critical moral
discernment on contemporary moral issues, and argues this can be rectified only by
reappropriating Aristotelian philosophy and natural law. See also Stephen J. Grabill,
Evangelicals and the Brave New World: Why Natural Law Can No Longer Be Ignored
(Sept. 6, 2006), http://www.acton.org/commentary/commentary_341.php (last visited Sept.
30, 2008).
12. See CRAIG A. BOYD, A SHARED MORALITY: A NARRATIVE DEFENSE OF NATURAL
LAW ETHICS (2007). Boyd argues: "In an increasingly global society where religious and
cultural differences are often accentuated and form the basis for conflict between peoples
and among nations, it would seem that natural law morality, if it can be coherently defended,
may provide a plausible common ground for people of diverse backgrounds." Id. at 11-12.
13. See J. DARYL CHARLES, RETRIEVING NATURAL LAW: A RETURN TO MORAL FIRST
THINGS (2008) [hereinafter CHARLES, RETRIEVING NATURAL LAW]. In an article based on his
forthcoming book, Charles contends that "apart from natural law, we lose any basis upon
which to build a moral apologetic and to contribute meaningfully to civil society." J. Daryl
Charles, Protestants and Natural Law, FIRST THINGS 33, 37 (Dec. 2006) [hereinafter
Charles, Protestantsand NaturalLaw].
14. See Alan F. Johnson, Is There a Biblical Warrantfor NaturalLaw Theories?, 25 J.
EVANGELICAL THEOLOGICAL SOC'Y 185 (1982); Carl E. Braaten, Protestants and Natural

Law, FIRST THINGS 20 (Jan. 1992).
15. See Henry, supra note 7, passim.

HeinOnline -- 2 Liberty U. L. Rev. 687 2007-2008

688

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 2:685

were all seriously wrong,' 6 and that unless evangelicals adopt a more
Catholic approach to natural law philosophy we will soon have no "basis
upon which to build a moral apologetic" in the public square, 7 and will
lose moral influence with nonbelievers for lack of "a bridge to connect the
Christian faith and culture."' 8 I will carry this debate past both positions by
arguing that, while historic Protestant skepticism is largely justified, relying
on a natural law strategy for moral apologetics can at times be effective, but
not when nonbelievers insist on denying recourse to more than nature for
distinguishing what is or is not morally normative in nature.
III. No SIMPLE DEFINITION
When it comes to evaluating natural law philosophy and tradition, the
most critical task is first to explain what one means by natural law, and that
is never easy. Many have noted the enormous range and consequent
difficulty of capturing the entire corpus in one definition. Arthur Harding,
in his book the Origins of the Natural Law Tradition, observes that
"[c]oncepts of Natural Law are almost as varied as are the philosophical
systems which have been evolved in the history of Western civilization."' 9
Daniel O'Connor thinks "various versions of the doctrine differ so much
both in their detail and in their philosophical bases that it is very misleading
to talk of the theory of natural law.",20 And Carl F. H. Henry observes that
natural law now means so many different things to so many different people
that some claim the term has no "precise content" and "changes with an
evolving society.'' 1 This is complicated by the fact that natural law
involves multiple concepts, with no proponent accepting all, and with no
principle of coherence-other than referring in some way to nature and
law--uniting all conceptions within a single rubric.

16. See id.; 1 HELMUT THIELIKE, THEOLOGICAL ETHICS (FOUNDATIONS) (William H.
Lazareth ed., 1979); HERMAN DOOYEWEERD, ROOTS OF WESTERN CULTURE: PAGAN,
SECULAR, AND CHRISTIAN OPTIONS 111-47 (Mark Vander Vennen et al. eds., John Kraay
trans., 2003) (1959); CORNELIUS VAN TIL, COMMON GRACE AND THE GOSPEL 23-95 (1974);
G. C. BERKOUWER, GENERAL REVELATION 187-214 (1955).
17. CHARLES, Protestantsand NaturalLaw, supra note 13, at 37.
18. Stephen J. Grabill, Protestants and Natural Law: A Forgotten Legacy, Acton
Institute PowerBlog, Aug. 9, 2006, http://blog.acton.org/archives/1095-Protestants-andNatural-Law-A-Forgotten-Legacy.html.
19. ORIGINS OF THE NATURAL LAW TRADrmON, at v (Arthur L. Harding ed., 1954).
20. D.J. O'CONNOR, AQUINAS AND NATURAL LAW 57 (1967).

21. Henry, supra note 7, at 54.
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This makes natural law, not just difficult, but impossible to define
without proposing a definition that is either innocuous or limited to less
than everything encompassed by natural law tradition taken as a whole.
This means we must either define natural law so broadly as to involve no
fixed content-as perhaps anything referring to nature and morality any
way at all-or must use a definition covering less than everything natural
law tradition encompasses as a whole. I will start with a rather broad yet
less than comprehensive definition that Christians will consider familiar,
and will proceed then to interact with conceptions extending beyond that
less than comprehensive starting point.
Unless stated otherwise, natural law as used in this paper means a
combination of the following: that some sort of moral ideal or ethical law
exists by which human laws and behavior can be evaluated; that this moral
ideal or ethical law is in some way present in nature; that what this moral
ideal or ethical law demands is knowable in some way (either by reason, or
intuition, or experience, or sensation) by men in their natural state (apart
from revelation, regeneration, or indoctrination); and that what this moral
ideal or ethical law requires relates to everyone, everywhere, all the time.
Nevertheless, readers should remember this is a working definition that
does not fully cover all versions of natural law philosophy, because not
every version agrees with all or even any of these defining elements.
Indeed some more recent variations maintain that natural standards are all
relative, subjective, and sensual, and therefore entail no fixed content.
IV. DIVIDED STREAMS
Using this ostensibly more familiar but admittedly less than
comprehensive definition, it is nevertheless clear that the evolution of
natural law tradition through history divides into profoundly irreconcilable
streams over whether the power by which one determines what is normative
in nature is itself part of nature, or is located beyond nature and only
reflected in nature. That is, whether the morally normative in nature
involves nothing more than what occurs in nature, or reflects rationally
discemable purposes and plans for how natural things should work even
when they do not, and in reference to which human beings can evaluate
natural occurrences as morally good or bad. In discussing these streams, I
will refer to versions deriving norms from nothing but nature as naturalist,
and to those relying on a source beyond nature as supernaturalist.
Despite differing on other matters, Protagoras and Socrates both took a
naturalist view of natural law. Protagoras is famous for asserting that "man
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is the measure of all things-of things that are, that they are, and of things
that are not, that they are not.', 22 He was not sure if gods existed, but did
not matter because he claimed if gods do exist they are no help when it
comes to moral knowledge.2 3 While Socrates may have regarded gods with
more respect, he did not think their existence made any difference to moral
knowledge. From what we know, Socrates taught that all men possess a
sense of morality by virtue of human nature, and can know what morality
requires by consulting their own natural desires. Thus, Plato credits
Socrates with arguing: "no one goes willingly toward the bad ... ; neither is
it in human nature... to want to go toward what one believes to be bad
instead of to the good., 24 Protagoras and Socrates were naturalists because
neither relied on the supernatural authority, and both held that nature as it
is, and nature alone, supplied its own standard of moral valuation.
While Protagoras and Socrates were naturalists, however, it appears that
many if not most ancient Greeks held some version of a supernaturalist
approach to natural law. At least we know from Thucydides that the
ancient men of Athens invoked a supernaturalist version of natural law to
justify conquering weak neighbors. When the people of Melos appealed to
natural conscience for maintaining independence, the ancient Athenians
answered that "of the gods we hold the belief, and of men we know, that by
the necessity of their nature, wherever they have power, they always
25
rule.

Seeing the difficulty Socrates had resisting the subjectivity of
Protagorian sophistry, Plato rejected naturalism in favor of supernaturalism,
but on terms other than the Athenians used to justify conquering weak
22.

1, quoted in BERTRAND RUSSELL, A
also DIOGENES LAERTIUS, LIVES OF
sophist and an agnostic, living around
the same time as Socrates. Although no complete work of his survives, portions of his work
PROTAGORAS, TRUTH OR DESTRUCTION fragment

HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 77 (1945); see
EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS bk. 9, § 51. Protagorus was a

and thought have been preserved through citations made by other authors of the time. See
ROBIN WATERFIELD, THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS: THE PRESOCRATICS AND SOPHISTS 210

(2000).
23. PROTAGORAS, ABOUT GODS fragment 4, quoted in EDWARD SCHIAPPA, PROTAGORAS
AND LOGOS: A STUDY IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY AND RHETORIC 141 (2003). The Greek text of
the fragment reads, "nepi tttv O6ecv o3 k(0 dc6tvat o60 6)q doiv, 00)8 6 o6nK oiv RoUA
yezp T&t
KcwXovTa dstvat, il T'd6ilX6rqq Kai opax6; 6bv 6 3io4 ou
T v0pdbnou," which Shiappa
renders, "Concerning the gods I am unable to know, whether they exist or whether they do
not exist or what they are like in form." See id. at 141. For further information on the
fragment, see generally id. at 141-54; LAERTIUS, supra note 22.
24. Plato, Protagoras, in COMPLETE WORKS 787 (John M. Cooper ed., Stanley
Lombardo & Karen Bell trans., 1997).
25. THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR bk. 5, § 105.
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neighbors. Plato held that morality in nature was a matter of finding
happiness by reaching the proper balance between sensual (material) and
intellectual (nonmaterial) pleasures. Rather than relying on the subjectivity
of human perception, Plato anchored the objectivity of natural morality not
in nature itself, but in something beyond nature. He argued that the right
balance for human happiness does not come from nature as it is, but from
conforming nature to supernatural standards, or forms, that exist
independent of nature and are only reflected in nature we observe and
experience. While Plato avoided the problem of moral subjectivity by
fixing standards of natural law in supernatural forms, he did not rely on
supernatural revelation and developed a view of natural law philosophy that
justified totalitarian control 26of religion, work, education, sex, and the
smallest details of family life.
After Plato, Aristotle developed a version of natural law philosophy that
reverted once more to naturalism. Aristotle held that what natural law
requires does not come from anything beyond nature, but involves nothing
more than observing nature as it is. Aristotle thought that moral objectivity
in natural law depends on assuming everything in nature has just one
function regardless of human ingenuity; and because he thought nature
shows there are different sorts of human nature Aristotle justified slavery
and argued that freeing slaves was immoral. "It is clear," he said, "that
some men are by nature free, and others slaves, and that for these slavery is
both expedient and right., 27 Following Aristotle, Epicurus took naturalism
a step further by reducing natural law to sensuality arguing that, "[i]f you
fight against all your sensations, you will have no standard [in nature] to
which to refer, and thus
no means of judging even those judgments which
28
you pronounce false.,
In the first century B.C., the Roman philosopher Cicero resorted to a
version of natural law rather similar to that used by the ancient Athenians.
Cicero's version of natural law attempted to justify the expansion of the
Roman empire as a natural duty to assemble as many as possible into a
single civil community "associated by a common acknowledgment of moral
right."2 9 Augustine criticized Cicero's natural law philosophy mainly for
the naive optimism by which Cicero assumed the possibility of arriving at a
26. See PLATO, REPUBLIC.

27.

ARISTOTLE, POLITICS §

1255a.

28. LAERTIUS, supra note 22, at bk. 10, § 146.
29. CICERO, THE REPUBLIC 1.25. The Christian theologian Augustine reacted very
sharply to Cicero's views in his own writings on this topic. See AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF
GOD AGAINST THE PAGANS bk. 19, ch. 21.
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common moral basis-equally acceptable to the godly and the ungodly-sufficient for uniting all humanity in a single governing administration
responsible for upholding and defending moral right and wrong.
Because "moral right is that which flows from the fountain of justice, 30
and because the one true God is the only source of true moral justice,
Augustine questioned how Cicero's presumption of an "assemblage of men
associated by a common acknowledgement of moral right" can ever arise to
unite those who serve the one true God with those who desert him to
worship "impure demons"? 31 Augustine argued "it is only when the soul
serves God that it exercises a right control over the body," and it is only
when reason submits to God that it is able then to "govern as it ought the
passions and other vices. 32 As such, there can be no true moral justice in
individuals who do not serve God and "there certainly can be none in a
community composed of such persons," and if so there can be no "common
acknowledgement of moral right which makes an assemblage of men a
people whose affairs we call a republic. 33 Augustine therefore argued
Cicero had to be wrong, since there can be no valid basis-no natural law
case for common moral ground-for believing those who know the one true
God could ever agree on moral matters to the degree required for uniting
them in a commonly administered society (or republic) with those who "do
not serve God but demons. 34
The early church mainly followed Augustine's rejection of natural law
philosophy for reaching common moral ground with non-Christians until
the thirteenth century when Thomas Aquinas rediscovered Aristotle and
developed another version of natural law-one based on biblically
35
grounded supernaturalism in place of Aristotle's scientific naturalism.
Unlike Aristotle, Aquinas did not think nature was itself the origin of moral
truth. He explained that "the light of natural reason, whereby we discern
what is good and what is evil, which pertains to the natural law, is nothing
else than an imprint on us of the divine light., 36 While Aquinas believed
that men see enough of God's moral reason in nature to guide them toward
earthly happiness, he also cautioned that "human reason is not itself the rule
30. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD AGAINST THE PAGANS bk 19, ch. 21.

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See O'CONNOR, supra note 20.
36. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. I-II, q. 91, a. 2 (Benziger Bros.
ed., 1947) (1274), availableat http://www.ccel.org/a/aquinas/summa/FP.html.
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of things. 37 Rather, human reason was only a capacity for perceiving
principles "contained in the eternal law" of God.3 8 So, for Thomas, natural
human capacity for discerning and interpreting true moral standards
reflected in nature is checked, validated, and illuminated by biblical
revelation and in that way moral agreement uniting Christians with nonChristians depends on whether and to what extent non-Christians agree to
seeing in nature what Christians can verify in relation to scripture.
In the sixteenth century, John Calvin reaffirmed how Aquinas identified
moral law in nature with the everlasting moral law of God.39 Calvin argued
that there is in reality just one moral law, and so "the law of God which we
call the moral law is nothing else than a testimony of natural law and of that
conscience which God has engraved upon the minds of men. ' '4
Nonetheless, Calvin was not as confident as Aquinas in the sufficiency of
fallen humanity to run a morally just civil order relying on natural reason
alone. Calvin held that, while "the purpose of natural law.., is to render
men inexcusable," 4' it did not mean that unregenerate men, left to their own
devices, could ever accurately comprehend-much less accept-the sort of
moral grounds needed to secure civil happiness. Calvin believed that sin so
thoroughly obscures the natural exercise of reason, that men must have
God's "written law to give us a clearer witness to what was too obscure in
the natural law.' 42
This led Calvin to conclude that men have by nature enough moral
knowledge to justify God's wrath, but not enough on its own to provide a
sufficient basis for "the preservation of society." He explained that as
fallen beings "we quite fail to take our concupiscence into account, for the
natural man refuses to be led to recognize the diseases of his lusts. The
light of nature is extinguished before he even enters upon this abyss.
Calvin therefore held that by natural reason men never truly discern, never
truly desire, and never truly will what is morally good and right apart from
supernatural intervention of the Holy Spirit. 44 So, while Calvin maintained
a version of natural law, its moral content was supernatural, its standards
37. Id. at q. 90, a. 3, r. 2.
38. Id.
39. See William Klempa, John Calvin on Natural Law, in JOHN CALVIN AND THE
CHURCH: A PRISM OF REFORM (Timothy George ed., 1990).
40. JoHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION bk. 4, ch. 20, § 16.
41. Id. atbk. 2, ch. 2, § 22.
42. Id. ch. 8, § 1.
43. Id. ch. 2, § 24.
44. Id. § 25-27.
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could not be discerned apart from the Holy Spirit, and therefore appealing
to natural law could not be used for defining common moral ground with
non-Christians who reject the Holy Spirit and rely on nothing more than
natural reason or conscience.
Other than debate that has continued among theologians regarding
various supernatural approaches to natural law following either Aquinas or
Calvin,45 the history of natural law philosophical tradition since the
sixteenth century has been one of steady decline into ever more narrow
versions of naturalism and less and less confidence in the possibility of
grounding moral objectivity in any understanding of nature.46
In the early seventeenth century, only two generations following Calvin,
the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius reaffirmed the possibility of employing
natural law philosophy on naturalistic, non-supernatural terms.47 While
continuing to hold that moral principles of natural law cannot be fully
known apart from accepting God's existence, Grotius nevertheless put such
faith in non-regenerate reason that he asserted that human capacity to arrive
at sound principles of social justice "would have a place even were we to
accept the infamous premise that God did not exist or did not concern
himself with human affairs.' ' 8 In so doing, Grotius made natural law a
product of autonomous, non-regenerated human reason. He severed reason
from needing to affirm the existence of God to the extent that how men
think of God has no necessary bearing on their ability to exercise reliable
moral judgment.
Following Grotius, others joined in divorcing natural law from
supernaturalism. Thomas Hobbes, claimed that a law of nature (meaning a
45. The highlight in the evolution of this ongoing discussion is perhaps EMIL BRUNNER
& KARL BARTH, NATURAL THEOLOGY (Geoffrey Bles ed., P. Fraenkel trans., 1964)
(including Emil Brunner, Nature and Grace and Karl Barth, No!).
46. It is often said of rationalists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, who
severed natural law from supernaturalism, that "far from establishing a new era of human
liberty, [they] actually set the stage for a process of deterioration which, if unchecked, will
destroy the very liberty which they asserted." Arthur L. Harding, The Ghost of Herbert
Spencer: A DarwinianConcept of Law, in ORIGINS OF THE NATURAL LAW, supra note 19, at
69, 70; see also EMIL BRUNNER, JUSTICE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 4-10 (Mary Hottinger
trans., 1945).
47. This in no way denies Oliver O'Donovan's very fine corrective as to ways in which
Hugo Grotius is often unfairly criticized. What I say here is valid and to the point, even
though it is true that Grotius also stressed the religious duty of obeying God and claimed
natural reason requires "that we must obey God without qualification." See OLIVER
O'DoNovAN, The Justice of Assignment and Subjective Rights in Grotius, in OLIVER
O'DoNOvAN & JOAN LOCKWOOD O'DoNovAN, BONDS OF IMPERFECTION (2004).
48. HUGO GROTIUS, DE luRE BELLI Ac PACS 12 (F.W. Kelsey et al. eds., 1925).
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moral rule derived from nature) is "the dictate of right reason, conversant
about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant
preservation of life and members, as much as in us lies"; 49 and Jean-Jacques
Rousseau believed that self-love is of itself alone "always good, always in
accordance with the order of nature. 5 ° This enlightenment version of
supernaturally detached natural law philosophy, which venerated reason "as
much as in us lies," came to be used during the French Revolution to justify
stealing whatever working class people wanted and slaughtering othersnot for what they did but for what they had. On this, Jacques Ellul observes
"it was not for nothing that the French Revolution inaugurated the cult of
the goddess Reason," 51 meaning that once men believe that nothing
transcends their own reason, then nothing they think reasonable can ever be
criticized as being wrong.
In the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer
developed still more narrow versions of naturalistic natural law philosophy.
Severed from the supernatural, these men found it harder than ever to
justify fixed moral standards based on nothing but nature as it is. Human
reason did not seem as reliable as it had. Mill denied that we should
assume nature even requires a unitary principle justified by whatever
someone or other considers reasonable. He decided that natural laws are
nothing more than regularities observable in nature, that moral judgments
based on natural laws are therefore nothing more than descriptions of what
happens to occur in nature, and that consequently faith in our own nonsupernatural "humanity" should replace all "supernatural religions. 52
At the same time, Herbert Spencer reduced natural law to evolutionary
naturalism, and in a way that erased distinctions separating human from
animal life, and denied society should assist weaker members. According
to Spencer, the only moral law in nature is the "law of natural selection" as
defined by Charles Darwin-the law that nature favors "survival of the
fittest." For Spencer this meant there is no duty for stronger, more able
members of society to aid the survival of anyone less fit. He held that
"human justice must be a further development of sub-human justice" and

49. THOMAS HOBBES, PHILOSOPHICAL RUDIMENTS CONCERNING GOvERNMENT AND
SOCIETY ch. 2, § 1, in 2 THE ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMESBURY 16

(William Molesworth ed., 1891) (footnote omitted).
50. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, MILE 174 (Barbara Foxley trans., 1974) (1762).
51. See JACQUES ELLUL, THE THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF LAW 31-36 (Marguerite
Wieser trans., 1960).
52. JOHN STUART MILL, THREE ESSAYS ON RELIGION 50 (1874).
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concluded that nature requires the strong and fit to eliminate every less fit
member of the human race. 3
Finally, the twentieth century witnessed the collapse of hope of finding
any fixed moral content based on taking a naturalistic (nonsupematural)
approach to natural law philosophy. While religious proponents still debate
Thomistic versus Reformed versions of natural law theology, atheistic
secularists have come to conclude natural law philosophy provides little or
no fixed content, and whatever may be left (in any) is certainly not thought
sufficient to secure social survival much less to provide an adequate basis
on which to establish reliable social order.
H. L. A. Hart developed what he called a "minimal content" naturalist
version of natural law, by which he meant the only truly necessary moral
content nature requires of civil law is the absolute minimum without which
most people in society will stop voluntary cooperation with a legal
system. Similarly, Rudolf Stammler and Georges Renard both argued that
with no reference beyond nature, natural law assures no fixed content at all.
Stammler proposed a "variable content" version,55 and Renard a
"progressive content" version,56 with both narrowing natural law
philosophy to a form able to convey any moral content at all. Stammler and
Renard together reduced natural law to what some have dismissed as "an
empty bottle decorated with a nice label." While their versions of natural
law philosophy are far from anything recognizable to Christians and are
nowhere close to the definition with which we started this survey, they do
constitute a segment of what natural law tradition has come to include. In
this, they do in fact represent what natural philosophy has come to mean for
many if not most secular (nonsupernaturalist) proponents in contemporary
Western culture.
V. DIMINISHING PROSPECTS FOR NONSUPERNATURALISM
Again, my reason for tracking the divided history of natural law tradition
is neither to dispute the reflection of God's moral order in creation, nor to
reject the sufficiency of natural evidences to justify God's condemnation of
fallen humanity, nor to question the reality of moral conscience in all
members of the human race. Rather, I have highlighted how natural law
philosophy has in fact evolved through history as proponents have divided
53. HERBERT SPENCER, THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHIcs pt. 4, § 12 (1892-93).
54. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 189-95 (1961).
55.

RUDOLPH STAMMLER, WIRTSCHAFTUND RECHT (1896).

56. GEORGES RENARD, LE DROIT, L'ORDRE ET LA RAISON (1927).
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over supernaturalism and rejecting the relevance of anything more than
nature for evaluating nature. I will now treat how this affects prospects for
relying on natural law philosophy for influencing nonbelievers in the public
square.
From the actual evolution of natural law tradition through time, it is hard
to ignore how once proponents reject supernaturalism, they have always
found it more and more difficult to agree on any common moral ground
with supernaturalists. From Protagoras to Spencer, from Aristotle to
Stammler, naturalists have slid from agreeing on basic standards sufficient
for assuring civil happiness, to only discovering laws of individual survival,
to denying any fixed standards at all. Over this same history, naturalists
have also claimed that natural law justifies slavery, slaughtering the
innocent, classifying dishonesty as a virtue, and exterminating weak or
needy members of the human race. What this history shows is that
rejecting the supernatural severs natural law from moral objectivity so that
approaching natural law on naturalist (nonsupernatural) terms necessarily
degenerates into naturalism and subjective reliance on sensuality. From a
purely naturalist (nonsupernatural) point of view, there is no basis for
distinguishing moral laws in nature from regularities of nature. Without
the supernatural, natural law reduces to ethical naturalism because moral
judgment based on nothing but nature can never justify anything more or
less than whatever we happen to see, feel, or experience in nature.
Noting how natural law philosophy deteriorates apart from
supernaturalism does not mean that evangelicals should never use natural
law for moral apologetics in the public square. Yet it is helpful to
illuminate when and to what degree relying on natural law philosophy is a
viable strategy for moral apologetics with naturalists. Jacques Ellul
suggests the utility of natural law apologetics for influencing nonbelievers
depends on the state of religious-moral decline in surrounding culture.57 A
limit is reached on the ability of supernaturalists to influence naturalists
using natural law apologetics when naturalists start refusing to accept any
matter reflecting faith in the supernatural. The possibility of finding
common moral ground is finally erased at the point that naturalists refuse to
cooperate with those who will not at the outset agree (or pretend to agree)
that nothing natural is ever wrong because nothing exists beyond nature as
it is.
Ellul notes how the effectiveness of relying on natural law philosophy
for establishing common moral ground with naturalists diminishes with the
57. ELLUL, supranote 51, at 31-36.
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religious-moral decline of culture. 5 8 That is,
so long as most people believe
in the existence God-or at least believe that moral standards observable in
nature depend on some notion of supernatural reality-there is hope of
reaching some basic agreement on moral standards justified through appeal
to natural law. Nonbelievers and believers will for a while agree on moral
standards discoverable in nature without seeming to require faith in
anything more than nature. After most members in a culture lose faith in
God, however, (not saving faith but belief that God exists) reaching the
point of denying that nature depends on anything more than nature as it is,
it becomes increasingly difficult for those who believe that way to agree on
any objectively fixed morality. At this point, therefore, it becomes
increasingly difficult for supernaturalists to find common moral ground
with naturalists on non-supernatural naturalistic terms.5 9
In describing the pathology of legal philosophy and systems of law, Ellul
observes several stages by which societies increasingly lose ability to
establish common moral ground based on natural law. First, denying that
natural law depends on more than nature makes it more and more difficult
for anyone to evaluate law (whether moral or civil) by anything other than
itself, and law "becomes purely a combination of technical rules." 60
Second, losing ability to recognize the reality or relevance of any authority
beyond what exists results in juridical technique falling victim to whatever
power insists on controlling it. 61 Third, denying accountability to any
authority beyond itself, the state starts claiming absolute authority over all
aspects of law; and when this happens the state becomes "judge of law" and
is no longer "judged in its actions by the law., 62 Fourth, when the state
transcends law (presumes absolute power over law), then what law is
required by the state "gradually ceases to be observed and respected. 63
More and more citizens begin viewing the law as unworthy and cease to
cooperate voluntarily, penalties are then tightened, the police system grows,
and society falls into chaos.
At the fifth and final stage, Ellul observes that attempts are often made
(by Christians or men of good will) "artificially to revive natural law, with
the hope of bringing law back to life." Nevertheless, these attempts are
doomed after passing "a point of no return," which occurs when denying
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 31
Id. at 32.
Id.at 33.
Id.
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the supernatural meets wide scale failure to agree on a body of commonly
respected standards relying on nature.64 At this final stage, nonsupernatural appeals to natural law philosophy are completely ineffective.
Nonbelievers can no longer be moved to restrain natural appetites based on
appealing to nothing more than nature; and Ellul argues that, once a culture
reaches this point, moral order cannot be restored apart from renewing faith
in God. He argues that, once a culture sinks to this level, no restoration is
by a "new civilization"; and that "can only
possible except for replacement
65
originate in the will of God.,
What Ellul contends is that, since the application and influence of moral
standards sufficient to secure and maintain social order is essentially
connected to supernaturalism, only faith in the moral authority of God is in
the end sufficient to check those who think they are of themselves able to
create law for themselves. Since creators are superior to what they create,
men are in the end immune from criticism based nothing more than
whatever laws they happen to create. What men make can be unmade
however it suits their passions, and only authority beyond human
manipulation is sufficient to check human manipulation. While most
members of society still accept the reflection in nature of something more
than nature, it is possible to establishing common moral standards on appeal
to nature. Nonbelievers and believers will agree on common standards
discoverable in nature without seeming to require faith in anything beyond
nature. When a declining culture loses confidence in the reality of moral
authority beyond nature reflected in nature, however, it becomes next to
impossible for naturalists and supernaturalist to arrive at common moral
ground based on acceptably similar views of nature.
VI. REDUCING EXPECTATIONS

This suggests that evangelicals must not think that relying on natural law
philosophy is always a good strategy for moral apologetics in the public
square.66 The unavoidable problem with employing natural law philosophy
as an apologetic strategy in atheistic circumstances is that naturalism will
never persuade atheistic naturalists to accept what is supernatural. In other
words, those who rely on more-than-naturecannot use nothing-but-nature
to persuade those who deny anything-more-than-natureto accept what
64. Id. at 35.
65. Id.at 35-36.
66. Meaning here a strategy that effectively convinces nonbelievers to endorse
biblically acceptable moral standards without appealing to supernatural authority.
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depends on more-than-nature. If an atheistic naturalist denies being able to
see in nature any reason for restraining natural passions, he or she will
never be persuaded to accept a more restrictive standard by appealing to
nothing more than that very nature in which he denies seeing any reason for
restriction. Such thinking will not change without referring to something,
or someone, greater than nature, an authority by which natural sensations,
experiences, and observations can be evaluated as to moral worth and
legitimacy.
Without accepting the relevance of supernaturalism, natural law
philosophy loses touch with moral objectivity and leads to indulging
whatever passions arise from natural sensation and experience. To ground
universally fixed moral objectivity independent of human subjectivity,
natural law requires more than atheistic naturalism. That is, natural law
philosophy must rely on something more than nature as it is. It requires the
supernatural. And evangelicals considering the value of natural law
philosophy for moral apologetics must understand that we cannot maintain
irreconcilable claims. That is, we cannot use supernaturalism to ground our
own knowledge of universal moral objectivity, while at the same time
alleging that those we plan to convince require no such thing.
Evangelicals attracted to natural law philosophy on supernatural terms
may try limiting its definition to exclude atheistic naturalism. If so, we may
not at the same time apply a non-atheistic point of view to arrive at some
alleged common moral ground with those who approach natural law on
atheistic terms. Further, should we accept a broader view encompassing the
entire range of natural law philosophic tradition to increase likelihood of
finding common ground with moral atheists, we will find that the only
moral standards on which atheistic naturalists agree are those derived from
ethical naturalism and no more. Either way evangelicals operating in the
public square are kept from arriving at common moral ground with avowed
atheists, because no one in the public square can win the day by
misrepresenting what others mean by natural law.
Once nonbelievers in a secular culture reject traditional moral norms as
alien to natural passions, it becomes impossible-not just difficult but
impossible-to restore their recovery by relying on nothing more than
nature as it is. At this point, appealing to natural law philosophy is
powerless to restrain moral decline, and moral apologetics by evangelicals
in the public square must look to another approach. An approach not
hampered by denying reliance on more than nature for evaluating nature;
one not afraid of directing men beyond themselves to their Creator; one that
promotes civil happiness, justice, and social order by appealing to Jesus
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Christ, not theocraticly, but in ways that respect the right of anyone to
persuade anyone else based on whatever that person considers convincing.
Evangelicals called to moral apologetics in the public square must realize
that, in a naturalistic, postmodern, nihilistic context, appealing to nature's
supernatural Creator is surely more promising than resorting to natural law
philosophy on atheistic terms. Where then does that leave us? On the one
hand, Alan Johnson, Carl Braaten, Stephen Grabill, Craig Boyd, and Daryl
Charles are surely right about scripture affirming a universal moral order
reflected in nature, so that access to this reflection transcends all races,
classes, cultures, and religions. Yet I believe they are wrong where they
fail to distinguish between the competing approaches to natural law. They
fail to distinguish between taking a supernatural biblically based approach
to natural law that supposes a reality beyond nature for determining what is
or is not moral in nature, and the various atheistic approaches to natural law
that either require denying there is anything wrong with nature or refuse to
allow recourse to more than nature for evaluating nature. Failing to make
this distinction leaves their case for reviving natural law as a "bridge
category" sits astride a logical non sequitur that supposes the term "natural
law" refers to exactly the same thing for naturalists and supernaturalists
alike. Failing to realize this distinction, however, involves more than logic,
for as long as evangelicals conflate incompatible notions of natural law
evangelical moral apologetics in the public square is reduced to no more
than arguing over what is acceptable to atheistic naturalism.
On the other hand, Carl F. H. Henry, R. Albert Mohler, and John
Warwick Montgomery-to say nothing of earlier giants of Protestant
theology such as Thielicke, Dooyeweerd, Van Til, and Berkouwer-are
surely right to insist that evangelicals must never deny the relevance of
supernaturalism for engaging the culture, and must not allow the morality
of natural reason to be severed from the morality of transcendent revelation.
Nevertheless, I believe these also are wrong where their concerns lead to
overlooking how the strategic value of using natural law philosophy for
moral apologetics varies with cultural degeneration. So while evangelical
traditionalists are right to warn against accommodating "postmodern
nihilism" in the guise of natural law, they should not deny the value of
natural law for influence the public square so long as the culture does not
insist on reducing natural law to moral atheism.
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VII. CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, I believe we should be neither naively optimistic
nor naively pessimistic. We should neither ignore nor exaggerate reasons
for historic Protestant skepticism, and we should neither claim that natural
law is never more than naturalism nor deny that natural law ever
encompasses naturalism. Evangelicals challenging historic Protestant
skepticism toward employing natural law philosophy must not confuse
biblically refereed knowledge of God's moral standards reflected in nature
with atheistic theories that deny there is anything wrong in nature. And
those who warn we must not reduce natural law to naturalism should not
reject using a natural law apologetic where it yet persuades nonbelievers to
accept God's standards for securing common life.
Of course, God's authority over creation applies whatever men think or
say, but the degree to which men deny that truth does directly affect the
degree to which natural law philosophy can work as a bridge for identifying
and defending moral ground acceptable to nonbelievers in the public
square.
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